AthonisOne module 05 of 08

Network

What your perimeter publishes — and what actually guards it.

Two questions about the devices that make up and guard your network: do we know all of them, and is each one scanned? And what do our perimeter devices publish to the internet, and how well do they guard it? The module reads each device's own configuration through its management API, with a read-only credential.

What it answers

The questions this module exists for.

  • 01 Do we have a complete inventory of our network infrastructure, and is all of it scanned?
  • 02 What does our perimeter actually publish to the internet, site by site?
  • 03 Which published services are protected by a WAF that blocks, and which by one that only watches?
  • 04 Can anyone on the internet reach a service directly, or does the firewall only admit our CDN?
  • 05 Are our firewalls hardened — no any-any rules, logging on, HA healthy, content current?
  • 06 Does our cloud-hosted WAF expose a cloud credential to a read-only login?
What it checks

In detail.

01

Inventory and scan coverage

Switches, routers, firewalls, WAFs and load balancers, with the profiling context that says what each one is and which of it is tier-0 — and which infrastructure is known to the network but not covered by vulnerability scanning.

02

Firewall configuration

Any-any permit rules that cross a zone boundary, permits that log nothing, permits with no security profile, a management interface reachable over plain HTTP, an unhealthy HA pair, stale threat content and a software train past the vendor's end of life. A rule that allows anything but only within one zone is not reported as an any-any permit — it opens nothing the firewall does not already allow — unless the device's own intrazone default denies, or could not be read.

03

Web application firewall configuration

Published services that only monitor instead of block, a production service in monitor mode while its non-production twin blocks, expired or legacy-TLS certificates, stale publications with no live backend, appliance defaults left in place — and an appliance that exposes a cloud credential to the read-only account it is read with.

04

Cloud-hosted appliances

A firewall or WAF that runs in the cloud is linked to the Azure virtual machines or Oracle Cloud instances it runs on, found by the address the appliance is managed on. The scan-coverage check then looks for every address those machines hold, so an appliance the scanner knows by another address is no longer reported as missing.

05

Cloud access control

The network security group verdict for each published address and port, evaluated in priority order the way the cloud platform does — reusing what the Cloud module already collected.

06

The exposure chain

For every hostname the perimeter publishes, one row that walks the path from the outside in — DNS and CDN, perimeter firewall, cloud access control, web application firewall, backend. Each hop reads permits, restricts, denies or not measured, and the row ends in one verdict: reachable, compensated, or not measured.

Typed findings

Each with the evidence behind it, not just a severity label.

Finding Wiki

A built-in explainer on every finding — what it is, why it matters, what to do.

A posture score

Rolled up from the findings and trended over time.

Compliance evidence

Findings mapped to the framework controls they evidence.

How it judges

Where it refuses to over-claim.

A check that guesses produces false findings, and false findings teach a team to ignore the real ones. These are the places this module holds back.

  • Compensated is a tag, never a suppression. A WAF in monitor mode behind a firewall that only admits the CDN keeps its finding and its severity — so a later change at the outer layer never silently exposes it.
  • The chain is only as complete as the layers collected. If a site's outer firewall wasn't read, every service at that site reads not measured — not reachable, and certainly not safe.
  • If one appliance can't be read on a sync, its findings stay open as last seen, dated, rather than being marked fixed. A source that went quiet is never allowed to look green.
  • A cloud appliance is matched to a machine only when exactly one cloud interface holds its management address. An address that several cloud networks reuse stays unmatched.
  • Protocol and certificate checks judge only enabled services that terminate TLS.
  • Every network finding cites real controls from the published standards, and none where no control fits.
What it reads

Connected to what you already run.

  • Cisco ISE
    Network device inventory and profiling attributes
  • Palo Alto Networks (PAN-OS)
    Rule base, NAT, zones, HA state, content currency — and whether each published service is reachable
  • Barracuda Web Application Firewall
    Published services, backends, block-vs-monitor policy, TLS and appliance hardening
What it never does

The boundary, stated plainly.

  • Never scans the network and never sends traffic at the perimeter. No port scanner, no discovery sweep, no path enumeration.
  • Never writes to a device. Every credential is read-only, and the PAN-OS API key is short-lived and not stored.

Findings from this module evidence the asset-management, network-security, perimeter-protection, device-hardening and coverage control areas of every activated framework.

See what Network would say about your estate.

Licensed on its own, and on the same platform as every other module. We'll show you the answer — and what it would say it couldn't measure.